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The Paris Agreement and Global Climate
Litigation after the Trump Withdrawal
DAVID HUNTER, WENHUI JI & JENNA RUDDOCK†

I. INTRODUCTION
When President Trump announced his intention to withdraw
from the Paris Agreement,1 it re-confirmed that the U.S. federal
government is not a reliable player in global efforts to combat climate
change.2 Other national governments, U.S. state and local
governments, private sector leaders and environmental organizations
all voiced their frustration.3 More generally, the United States’
reversal was a reminder that the world’s response to climate change
should not be hostage to the whims of the political branches of
government. Government regulators, who operate with a relatively
short time horizon and are frequently captured by the regulated
community, need to be monitored and sometimes prodded by an
engaged judiciary.
© 2018 David Hunter, Wenhui Ji, Jenna Ruddock
† David Hunter is Professor of Law at American University Washington College of
Law. He specializes in international and comparative environmental law. Wenhui Ji received
her JD from Vermont Law School in 2017 and is currently an LLM candidate in
International Law at American University Washington College of Law. Jenna Ruddock is a
JD candidate at American University Washington College of Law interested in
environmental and human rights law.
1. For the Paris Agreement, see G.A. Res. 1/CP.21, Paris Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015),
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
2. Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y.
TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-ag
reement.html.
3. Nadja Popovich & Tatiana Schlossberg, How Cities and States Reacted to Trump’s
Decision to Exit the Paris Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2017/06/02/climate/trump-paris-mayors.html.
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The emergence of climate-related litigation in the United States
and abroad pre-dates the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement, but that withdrawal underscored the need for
judicial engagement. Climate-related litigation now includes many
different approaches and legal theories.4 Some cases aim to hold
fossil fuel companies liable for damages for injuries attributable to
climate change.5 Some cases aim to ensure climate change is taken
into account in planning decisions or in financial disclosures.6 More
commonly, claims aim at strengthening a government’s approach to
mitigating climate change either generally or with respect to a
specific project. Particularly in these latter cases, the Paris
Agreement is playing a critical and somewhat surprising role—given
that by its terms it creates no internationally binding mitigation
requirement.7
This article explores the ways in which litigants and courts
around the world are invoking the Paris Agreement to push for a
stronger response to climate change. This article focuses on two
general categories of litigation where the Paris Agreement is playing,
or is likely to play, a vital role: (1) litigation aimed at strengthening
governments’ climate change mitigation efforts (notwithstanding the
well-known non-binding nature of the mitigation commitments under
the Paris Agreement);8 and (2) litigation involving financial
disclosure and investment expectations of the fossil fuel industry.9
The Paris Agreement’s mitigation commitments are not necessarily
being enforced directly, but the Agreement’s mitigation framework,
including the particular Nationally Determined Contributions
(NDCs), mid- and long-term goals and the temperature targets,
provides a policy and factual benchmark against which courts are
4. A recent United Nations report identified 654 climate-related cases in the United
States and 230 others in 24 countries worldwide. U.N. ENV ’T PROGRAMME THE STATUS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION : A GLOBAL REVIEW 10–11 (2017) [hereinafter UNEP
Climate Litigation Report]; see also Jeffrey Williamson, As Climate Lawsuits Grow
Worldwide, Legal Strategies Evolve Too, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Dec. 26, 2018),
https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/12/26/legal-strategy-climate-lawsuits/.
5. See, e.g., Dana Drugmand, Courts Will Play Key Role in Addressing Climate Crisis,
Experts Say, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.
org/2018/09/27/climate-crisis-litigation-columbia/ (summarizing tort-based litigation to
recover the costs of addressing climate change).
6. See UNEP Climate Litigation Report, supra note 4, at 14; Geetanjali Ganguly,
Joana Setzer & Veerle Heyvaert, If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for
Climate Change, 38 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 841, 860 (2018).
7. See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(19).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 35-107.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 108-31.
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evaluating government or private sector actions.10 The Paris
Agreement’s utility in litigation thus extends beyond the legal nature
of its mitigation commitments. As a result, although other obstacles
to climate litigation exist in the United States, President Trump’s
announced withdrawal may not significantly lessen the value of the
Paris Agreement to judicial review even here in the United States.
After a brief summary of the Paris Agreement’s approach to
climate mitigation,11 Parts II to IV of this article survey the use of the
Agreement in cases evaluating the government’s approach to climate
change mitigation under national law,12 international human rights
law,13 and international environmental law.14 Part V analyzes the
signaling effect of the Paris Agreement in shaping cases involving
financial disclosure and investment-backed expectations of the fossil
fuel industry.15 The conclusion briefly considers the potential impact
of the Trump withdrawal on the Paris Agreement’s litigation role.16
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT’S APPROACH TO
CLIMATE MITIGATION
The 2015 Paris Agreement was celebrated as a major advance in
the world’s efforts to address climate change, in particular because
for the first time all countries agreed to take steps to mitigate or
prevent climate change.17 The Paris Agreement sits within the
framework established by the 1992 United Nations Framework on
Climate Change (UNFCCC).18 Under the UNFCCC, the objective of
global cooperation in climate negotiations is to “prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference” (known as (DAI), which is defined in
terms of avoiding significant damage to natural ecosystems, food
security and economic development).19 To meet the objective of
avoiding DAI, the Paris Agreement sets the overall mitigation target
“to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below
10. See infra text accompanying notes 35-47.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 17-34.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 35-47.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 48-90.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 91-107.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 108-31.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 132-34.
17. See Historic Paris Agreement on Climate Change: 195 Nations Set Path to Keep
Temperature Rise Well Below 2 Degrees Celsius, UNFCCC (Dec. 13, 2014), https://unfccc.
int/news/finale-cop21.
18. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC].
19. Id. art. 2.
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2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing
that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate
change.”20 The 2°C temperature goal reflects the governments’
consensus of the maximum temperature rise that would give the
world a reasonable chance of avoiding significant harm from climate
change. The Parties also recognized that this goal might be
insufficient, and thus agreed to “pursue efforts” to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5°C.
Rather than negotiating a carbon budget with binding national
targets and timetables aimed at meeting the temperature goal, each
country was invited to announce their own nationally determined
mitigation actions in the run-up and during the Paris negotiations.21
The resulting NDCs comprise each country’s primary commitments
to help prevent climate change under the Paris Agreement
framework.22 As of March 2019, one-hundred-eighty-two countries
had formally announced an NDC in support of the overall objectives
of the Agreement.23
Despite near universal participation in adopting NDCs, by all
accounts the cumulative pledges fall significantly short of the total
emissions reductions needed to achieve the Paris Agreement’s 2°C
goal and by implication the UNFCCC’s objective to avoid DAI.24
Although estimates vary, according to the United Nations, fully
implementing the current NDCs would meet only one-third of the
necessary emissions reductions.25
The Parties anticipated that the initial NDCs would leave such
an “emissions gap” and established a process for increasing NDCs
over time.26 The Parties agreed to review their NDCs and
communicate “successive” NDCs every five years, beginning in
2020.27 The Parties are not allowed to backslide on their
20. See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(a) (emphasis added).
21. See UNFCCC, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), https://unfccc.int/pro
cess/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions/ndc-registry (last visited Mar.
28, 2019) [hereinafter NDC Registry]; see also Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
22. See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(a).
23. For a list of NDCs submitted pursuant to the Paris Agreement, see NDC Registry,
supra note 21.
24. The United Nations issues an annual report assessing progress on the Nationally
Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement. See, e.g., U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME,
EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 (2018).
25. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2017, at xiv (2017).
26. Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.
27. Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(9); see also Framework Convention on
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commitments. Each Party’s successive NDC should “represent a
progression beyond the Party’s then current [NDC] … and reflect its
highest possible ambition.”28 In addition, the Parties also signaled
their long-term resolve to move the world beyond fossil fuels to a low
carbon future. The Paris Agreement endorses a “global peaking” of
GHG emissions “as soon as possible” and commits countries to
“rapid reductions thereafter … so as to achieve a balance between
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases in the second half of this century.”29 To
operationalize these long-term goals, the Parties should submit “midcentury, long-term low greenhouse gas emission development
strategies” by 2020.30
Although the Paris Agreement is a binding international
agreement, the Parties carefully crafted the language for the NDCs
and other mitigation commitments to ensure that the specific
commitments were not binding as a matter of international law.31 The
Agreement does not contemplate any legal process for enforcing or
compelling a Party to implement their NDC. Nor does the Paris
Agreement explicitly create or require any cause of action to enforce
the NDC under national law. The soft law, non-binding nature of the
NDCs was a condition for gaining U.S. support for the Agreement.32
The non-binding nature of the NDCs may be less important than it
initially seems. The Paris Agreement contemplates a harmonized
“rulebook” that sets forth a transparent system to allow the
international community to track and evaluate implementation of the

Climate Change, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-First Session, ¶¶ 23–
24, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Jan. 29, 2016) (the Parties request a new NDC
from those having 2025 as their target date and only urge a new NDC in 2020 from those
having 2030 as a target date) [hereinafter Report of the Paris CoP].
28. Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(3).
29. Id. art. 4(1).
30. Report of the Paris CoP, supra note 27, ¶ 35; see also Paris Agreement supra note
1, art. 4(19).
31. Paris Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.
org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/09/the-paris-agreement-faqs/ (last visited Mar. 29,
2019).
32. Erika Rosenthal, Paris Climate Agreement: A Good Deal for the United States. An
Essential Deal for the Planet, EARTH JUSTICE (Mar. 29, 2019), https://earthjustice.org/featur
es/paris-agreement.
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commitments.33 More to the point, national courts in several
countries are enforcing, or otherwise invoking, the Paris Agreement
in evaluating the adequacy of climate mitigation efforts.34
III. ENFORCING THE NDCS
Although the Paris Agreement’s non-binding treatment of NDCs
clearly avoids state-to-state enforcement under international law, as
this section demonstrates a country’s NDC may nonetheless be
enforceable as a matter of national law. National courts may be
enlisted to review the adequacy of NDCs, progress in their
implementation, or the consistency of proposed activities with their
NDCs.
In New Zealand, for example, Susan Thomson, a law student,
sought judicial review of the adequacy of New Zealand’s NDC
primarily based on administrative law requirements.35 The High
Court of New Zealand rejected the government’s arguments opposing
judicial review, finding that the urgency of climate change required
judicial scrutiny over what might otherwise be considered a strictly
political issue.36
The Court held that the government acted
unlawfully when it failed to review its 2050 mitigation target to
reflect advancements in climate science.37 As a matter of national
law, the Court required the government to review its long-term target
whenever the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
issued a new report.38 The Court ultimately deferred its review of the
adequacy of the NDC in part because an incoming government had
announced it would review the NDC within a year.39

33. The Parties made significant progress in negotiating the rulebook in the 2018
Conference of the Parties. See Success of COP24 – We Have the Katowice Rulebook, COP24KATOWICE 2018 (Dec. 15, 2018), https://cop24.gov.pl/news/news-details/news/success-ofcop24-in-katowice-we-have-a-global-climate-agreement/.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 35-47.
35. Rebecca Macfie, New Zealand’s first climate change lawsuit rejected by High
Court, NOTED (Nov. 17, 2019), https://www.noted.co.nz/planet/new-zealand-s-first-climatechange-lawsuit-rejected-by-high-court/.
36. The Court first rejected the government’s argument that the adequacy of its climate
targets involved balancing many socioeconomic factors and were thus “political”. The Court
also rejected the government’s argument that because the NDCs were made pursuant to an
international agreement, the courts should not intervene in the executive branch’s exercise of
its foreign relations authority. Thomson v. Minister for Climate Change Issues [2017] NZHC
733 [¶¶ 133–134] per Mallon J (N.Z.) [hereinafter Thomson v. New Zealand].
37. Id.
38. Id. ¶¶ 93–98.
39. Id.
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In Ireland, Friends of the Irish Environment has announced a
suit against the government claiming that the country’s 2017 National
Mitigation Plan is inadequate, as it would result in Ireland exceeding
its equitable share of the global carbon budget implicit in the Paris
Agreement.40 The suit also alleges violations of the Climate Act, the
Irish Constitution, and human rights obligations.41 The case was not
decided as of March 2019.42
The Paris Agreement has also been invoked against specific
projects that are arguably either inconsistent with NDCs or have not
been adequately assessed in light of their NDC. In 2017, for
example, the South African High Court for North Gauteng
invalidated the approval of a proposed coal-fired power plant because
the environmental assessment had not included an assessment of
climate change impacts. 43 The Court noted that South Africa’s NDC
under the Paris Agreement contemplated growth in carbon emissions
from coal-fired power plants, but found that climate change impacts
must nonetheless be considered in permitting new plants:
The respondents further argued that the power station
project is consistent with South Africa’s NDC under
the Paris Agreement, which envisages that South
Africa’s emissions will peak between 2020 and 2025.
Again, I agree with Earthlife that this contention
misses the point. The argument is not whether new
coal-fired power stations are permitted under the Paris
Agreement and the NDC. The narrow question is
whether a climate change impact assessment is
required before authorising new coal-fired power
stations. A climate change impact assessment is
necessary and relevant to ensuring that the proposed
coal-fired power station fits South Africa’s peak,

40. As of January 2019, the pleadings in the case have not been made public but the
action is described at the Friends of the Irish Environment’s website. See CLIMATE CASE
IRELAND, https://www.climatecaseireland.ie/climate-case/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. EarthLife Africa Johannesburg v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs [2017] 65662/16 2
(High Ct. of S. Afr., Gauteng Division, Pretoria) [hereinafter EarthLife v. South Africa]; see
also Leonie Joubert, Court Stalls New Coal Plan in South Africa, ENERGY TRANSITION: THE
GLOBAL ENERGIEWENDE (Oct. 10, 2017), https://energytransition.org/2017/10/court-stallsnew-sa-coal-mega-station/.
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plateau and decline trajectory as outlined in the NDC
and its commitment to build cleaner and more efficient
than existing power stations.44
The South African decision referenced the NDC as the
framework against which to evaluate climate-related decisions even
though South Africa had yet to enact the Paris Agreement into
domestic law.45
In another example, an Australian court recently cited
inconsistency with Australia’s commitment to the goals of the Paris
Agreement as one of the arguments for denying a permit for a new
coal mine.46 The Court held:
The Project will be a material source of GHG
emissions and contribute to climate change. Approval
of the Project will not assist in achieving the rapid and
deep reductions in GHG emissions that are needed
now in order to balance emissions by sources with
removals by sinks of GHGs in the second half of this
century and achieve the generally agreed goal of
limiting the increase in global average temperature to
well below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels. . .
In short, an open cut coal mine in this part of the
Gloucester valley would be in the wrong place at the
wrong time. Wrong place because an open cut coal
mine in this scenic and cultural landscape, proximate
to many people’s homes and farms, will cause
significant planning, amenity, visual and social
impacts. Wrong time because the GHG emissions of
the coal mine and its coal product will increase global
total concentrations of GHGs at a time when what is
now urgently needed, in order to meet generally
agreed climate targets, is a rapid and deep decrease in
GHG emissions. These dire consequences should be
avoided. The Project should be refused.47

44.
45.
46.
2019).
47.

EarthLife v. South Africa, supra note 43, ¶ 90.
Id.
Gloucester Resources Ltd. v. Minister for Planning [2019] NSWLEC 7 (Feb. 8,
Id. ¶¶ 697-699 (emphasis added).
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The Australian court thus used the temperature and longer term goals
of the Paris Agreement as a benchmark against which to measure the
government’s actions in denying the coal mine permit.
The judicial review of NDCs by national courts like New
Zealand may not be so surprising to the extent that the NDCs are
enacted as part of national law. Perhaps more surprising is the South
African and Australian courts’ use of the Paris Agreement’s overall
mitigation framework, including the temperature targets and the midand long-term mitigation goals. These courts do not rely on the Paris
Agreement as setting a binding legal standard, but rather as a
“generally agreed” benchmark for evaluating government decisions
relating to climate change. This is the same approach being taken in
climate change cases relying on international human rights law, as
discussed below.
IV. THE PARIS AGREEMENT AS DEFINING HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS OF STATES
For many years now, human rights advocates have warned that,
if left unchecked, climate change would lead to significant violations
of human rights.48 A stable climate system, and by implication, the
destruction of a stable climate system, have been linked not only to a
right to a healthy environment, but also to the rights to life, family,
water, housing, and food, among others.49 The UNFCCC objective of
DAI explicitly references the need to avoid socioeconomic impacts
on food security and economic development.50 As a result, if a
country fails to meet the objective under the UNFCCC, they are also
failing to prevent violations of associated human rights. Put another
48. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Human rights and climate change ¶1, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/35/L.32 (June 19, 2017); Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable
environment ¶¶ 23-39, 65, 68, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/52 (Feb. 1, 2016) (noting that the “. . .
greater the increase in average temperature, the greater the effects on the right to life and
health. . .”) [hereinafter “Report on the Issue of Human Rights Relating to the
Environment”]; see also Joint statement by UN Special Procedures on the occasion of World
Environment Day, U.N. OFFICE OF HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (June 5, 2015),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16049&LangID=
E (reiterating that “an average increase in global temperature of even 2.0°C will adversely
affect a wide range of human rights, including the rights to life …”); Rep. of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship Between Climate
Change and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009), https://undocs.org
/A/HRC/10/61 [hereinafter OHCHR].
49. See OHCHR, supra note 48, ¶¶ 20-41; see also David Hunter, Human Rights for
Climate Change Implications, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 331 (2009).
50. UNFCCC, supra note 18, art. 2.
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way, determinations of what collectively countries must do to meet
the UNFCCC obligation also reflects what countries collectively
must do at a minimum to reach a safe level of emissions for
protecting human rights.
As noted above, the NDCs under the Paris Agreement leave us
cumulatively well short of achieving the 2°C temperature goal, let
alone the more ambitious 1.5°C goal.51 The Paris Agreement’s
temperature goal reflects a determination that holding temperatures
“well below 2°C” is necessary to avoid impacts beyond DAI under
the climate regime.52 Estimates suggest that the current NDCs, if
fulfilled, would allow an estimated increase in global average
temperatures of 3.3°C.53 Such a temperature increase would, among
other things, threaten food security, create severe water shortages,
cause fatalities from extreme heat, and leave millions of individuals
displaced by sea level rise and increased frequency of extreme
weather events.54 This result threatens the realization of basic human
rights. Although the meeting the Paris Agreement goals may not be
sufficient to protect human rights from the impact from the impact of
climate change, attaining them is certainly a minimum step forward
from the status quo.
Viewed in this light, the Paris Agreement helps to define what
temperature goal and by implication what mitigation efforts are at a
minimum to protect the “right to life” or the right to a “healthy
environment.” In the past few years, human rights advocates have
increasingly incorporated the science-based, political consensus of
the Paris Agreement, particularly its temperature goals, in asking
courts to review their country’s respective efforts to protect
internationally or nationally recognized individual rights against the
threats posed by climate change. The leading case taking this

51. Facilitating Global Transition: The Role of National Determined Contributions in
Meeting the Long-term Temperature Goal of the Paris Agreement, NDC PARTNERSHIP
http://ndcpartnership.org/facilitating-global-transition-role-nationally-determinedcontributions-meeting-long-term, (last visited Mar 30, 2019).
52. See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl. (“In furtherance of the objective of the
Convention”), art. 2(1) (“in enhancing implementation of the Convention, including its
objective”).
53. See Increase in Global Temperature by 2100, CLIMATE INTERACTIVE SCOREBOARD,
https://img.climateinteractive.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Scoreboard-static-cleanApr5.png (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).
54. See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, TURN DOWN THE HEAT: WHY A 4°C WARMER
WORLD MUST BE AVOIDED , at xvi (2012).
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approach is Urgenda v. Netherlands, in which an appellate court has
upheld a rights-based challenge claiming the Netherlands’
commitments to mitigate climate change are insufficient.55
A. Urgenda v. Netherlands
In Urgenda, a Dutch environmental group sued the Netherlands
government for its inadequate action to prevent serious
environmental and health risks from climate change, which Urgenda
alleged violated the government’s obligation to protect its citizens’
rights to life and to family life under the European Convention of
Human Rights.56 The plaintiffs sought to compel the government to
impose more stringent restrictions on greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions than currently contemplated.57 The plaintiffs specifically
cited the Dutch government’s decision to significantly scale back its
previous commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.58 Until
2011, the Netherlands had promoted a thirty percent reduction from
1990 levels by 2020, but political considerations led the Netherlands
to reduce its commitment by the time of the lawsuit to seventeen
percent.59 The plaintiffs challenged the lack of scientific support for
lowering the Dutch commitment and argued that the government had
failed to fulfill its obligation toward the plaintiffs.60 In 2015, the
Hague District Court agreed with the plaintiffs. The court ordered
the government to reduce emissions at least twenty-five percent from
1990 levels, while leaving the choice of reduction methods to the
government.61

55. Hof Den Haag 9 Oktober 2018, AB 2018, 417 m.nt. Van G.A., Van der Veen en
Ch.W. Backes (De Staat Der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.) [hereinafter Urgenda
App. Dec.].
56. See Rechtbank Den Haag, 24 Juni 2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2591 (Stichting
Urgenda/De Staat Der Nederlanden) (Neth.) [hereinafter Urgenda Lower Ct. Dec.]; see also
Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Environment, ETS
No. 005, Arts. 2, 8 (1950) [hereinafter ECHR]; see generally Eleanor Stein & Alex Geert
Castermans, Comment, Urgenda v. The State of the Netherlands: The “Reflex Effect” –
Climate Change, Human Rights, and the Expanding Definitions of the Duty of Care, 13
MCGILL J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. 303, 305 (2017); Josephine van Zeben, Establishing a
Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?, 4
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 339, 341 (2015).
57. Urgenda App. Dec, supra note 55.
58. Stein & Castermans, supra note 56; van Zeben, supra note 56.
59. Urgenda Lower Ct. Dec., supra note 56.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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In upholding the appeal, the Hague Court of Appeal relied in
part on the Paris Agreement (negotiated after the lower court’s
opinion was issued) in defining the Netherlands’ duty of care.62 The
Court first reviewed the potential impacts of climate change, finding
that there is: “a real threat of dangerous climate change, resulting in
the serious risk that the current generation of citizens will be
confronted with loss of life and/or a disruption of family life . . .[I]t
follows from Articles 2 and 8 [of the] ECHR that the State has a duty
to protect against this real threat.”63 Having rooted the legal
obligation in the human rights to life (Article 2) and to family life
(Article 8) under the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), the question remained as to what level of care would meet
the State’s obligation to protect these rights. The Court found the
answer at least partly in the Paris Agreement. The Court noted the
Netherlands had committed in the Paris Agreement to keeping the
global rise in temperature “well below” the 2o C limit and that a
‘safe’ temperature rise should not exceed 1.5oC.64 In order to achieve
these levels, the Court noted that the atmospheric concentration of
greenhouse gases could not exceed four hundred and fifty and four
hundred and thirty ppm, respectively.65 The Court used these
references to conclude that at least a twenty-five to forty percent
reduction of CO2 is not an “overly pessimistic starting point[] for
establishing the State’s duty of care.”66
The Court traced the long negotiating process that led to the
Paris Agreement and reflected on the Netherlands approach to
reduction target over the years. The Court found that:
The State has known about the reduction target of
twenty-five to forty percent for a long time. The IPCC
report which states that such a reduction by end-2020
is needed to achieve the 2oC target (AR4) dates back
to 2007. Since that time, virtually all COPs (in Bali,
Cancun, Durban, Doha and Warsaw) have referred to
this twenty-five to forty percent standard and Annex I
countries have been urged to align their reduction
targets accordingly. This may not have established a
legal standard with a direct effect, but the Court
believes that it confirms the fact that at least a twenty62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Urgenda App. Dec., supra note 55.
Id. ¶ 45.
Id. ¶ 44.
Id.
Id. ¶ 50.
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five to forty percent reduction of CO2 emissions as of
2020 is required to prevent dangerous climate
change.67
Based on this analysis, the Court held that the State’s duty of
care to protect the rights of its citizens required the State to reduce its
emissions by at least twenty-five percent from 1990 levels by the end
of 2020.68 Interestingly, the State did not hold that the Paris
Agreement created a legally binding obligation. Rather, the Paris
Agreement’s temperature goals, as well as the science underlying
those goals, were used as evidence of a generally accepted minimum
level of action necessary to meet a legal obligation rooted in the
ECHR.69
B. Other Rights-based Cases
Urgenda has inspired a number of youth groups to explore
similar rights-based challenges to their country’s climate-related
policies. For example, in Colombia twenty-five young plaintiffs
alleged that deforestation rates violated their human rights under the
1991 Colombian Constitution, including rights to a healthy
environment, life, food and water.70 In April 2018, the Colombian
Supreme Court of Justice ruled in favor of the plaintiffs who
challenged the government’s failure to prevent accelerating rates of
deforestation in the Amazon basin.71 Like the outcome in the
Urgenda case, the Colombian court mandated that the government
67. Id. ¶ 51.
68. Id. ¶ 76.
69. Id.
70. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Civil abril 5,
2018, M.P.: Luis Armando Tolosa Villabona, STC4360-2018, Radicación No. 11001-22-030000-2018-00319-01 (Colom.) [hereinafter Barragán, C.S.J. Dec.]; see also Ucilia Wang,
Colombian Court Orders Government to Stop Deforestation, Protect Climate, CLIMATE
LIABILITY NEWS (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/04/05/colombiaamazon-climate-change-deforestation/. Similarly, in Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, a
farmer sued the national government for failure to carry out the 2012 National Climate
Policy and Framework. Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Lahore
High Ct.) (2015) (Pak.). The Lahore High Court ruled that “Climate Change is a defining
challenge of our time and has led to dramatic alterations in our planet’s climate system . . .
[O]n a legal and constitutional plane this is a clarion call for the protection of fundamental
rights of the citizens of Pakistan.” Id. ¶ 6. The court found that “the delay and lethargy of the
State in implementing the Framework offend the fundamental rights of the citizens.” Id. ¶ 8.
Accordingly, the court created a twenty-one-member Climate Change Commission to help
ensure implementation of the climate laws. See id. ¶ 8.
71. Anastasia Moloney, Colombia’s Top Court Orders Government to Protect Amazon
Forest in Landmark Case, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/uscolombia-deforestation-amazon/colombias-top-court-orders-government-to-protect-amazonforest-in-landmark-case-idUSKCN1HD21Y.
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take action in the near future, without specifying exactly what
measures would be sufficient.72 The Court also declared the Amazon
to be an “entity subject of rights,”73 extensively referencing the
importance of the Amazon basin to achieving Colombia’s
international climate change commitments, including those set under
the Paris Agreement.
Inspired by Urgenda and other youth-based lawsuits, a group of
elderly Swiss women sued their government arguing that Switzerland
was not on an emissions reduction trajectory consistent with the Paris
Agreement’s 2ºC temperature goal.74 This failure, they alleged, was
also a failure to meet the State’s obligation to prevent violations of
articles 10 (right to life), 73 (sustainability principle), and 74
(precautionary principle) of the Swiss Constitution and by articles 2
(right to life) and 8 (right to family life) of the ECHR.75 They asked
the government to work towards achieving greenhouse gas emissions
reductions of at least twenty-five percent below 1990 levels by 2020
and at least fifty percent below 1990 levels by 2050.76 In November
2018, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court dismissed the claim,
finding that the elderly plaintiffs were not particularly vulnerable
from climate change and thus had no justiciable claims different than
that of the general public.77
C. The Rights-based Approach in the United States: Juliana v.
United States
To highlight the impacts of climate change on future
generations,78 twenty-one children and young adults filed suit against
the federal government, alleging that the U.S. government has failed

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Request to Stop Emissions in Climate Protection Pursuant to Art. 25(a) APA
and Art. 6 ¶ 1 and 13 ECHR, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz v. Federal Council (Oct. 25,
2016), https://klimaseniorinnen.ch/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Gesuch-um-Erlass-Verfuegu
ng_Sperrfrist.pdf (Switz.).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVGE] [Federal Administrative Court] Nov. 27, 2018,
A-2992/2017, https://klimaseniorinnen.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Scan_urteil-BvG_20
180512.pdf (Switz.).
78. See First Amended Complaint, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D.
Or. Sept. 10, 2015) (No.: 6:15-cv-01517-TC) [hereinafter Juliana Complaint]. For all of the
major filings in the case, see OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST, https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/
juliana-v-us.
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to enact climate change policies that would adequately protect their
constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property, as well as public
trust resources.79
The plaintiffs alleged that despite knowing “for decades” that
GHG emissions contributed to climate change, the federal
government has “continued to permit, authorize, and subsidize fossil
fuel extraction, development, consumption and exportation,”
including on federal land.80 The complaint states claims for
violations of several constitutional principles, including the due
process clause and equal protection principles of the Fifth
Amendment and certain unenumerated rights in the Ninth
Amendment, as well as for violation of the public trust doctrine.81 As
redress for these violations, the complaint requests the defendants
cease “permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing” fossil fuels and to
develop and implement a “national plan,” which would include
limiting the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide to three
hundred and fifty parts-per-million by the year 2100.82
In a remarkable decision, District Court Judge Aiken recognized
“the right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life is
fundamental to a free and ordered society.”83 As the court held in
2016 and reaffirmed in 2018:
where a complaint alleges knowing governmental
action is affirmatively and substantially damaging the
climate system in a way that will cause human deaths,
shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage
to property, threaten human food sources, and
dramatically alter the planet’s ecosystem, it states a
claim for a due process violation. To hold otherwise
would be to say that the Constitution affords no

79. Juliana Complaint, supra note 78, ¶¶ 277-309. See generally Gabriela Steier, No
Ordinary Lawsuit: Juliana v. United States is a Landmark Precedent for Climate Change
Legislation, JURIST (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2017/01/gabrielasteier-juliana-v-united-states/; Rick Reibstein, Can Our Children Trust Us with Their
Future? Juliana is a Reminder That the Government’s Purpose is to be a Guardian for
Future Generations, A.B.A. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_
lawyers/publications/tyl/topics/environmental-law/can-our-children-trust-us-their-future.
80. Juliana Complaint, supra note 78, ¶¶ 5-7.
81. Id. ¶¶ 277-309.
82. Id. ¶ 310.
83. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016) [hereinafter
“Juliana I”].
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protection against a government’s knowing decision to
poison the air its citizens breathe or the water its
citizens drink.84
The Court found that the plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to
develop their claim through discovery.
The plaintiffs in Juliana chose not to rely on the Paris
Agreement temperature goals in defining what steps they sought the
government to take, in part because they view the 2oC target as too
high to ensure a stable climate system.85 The structure of the
argument is largely the same as in Urgenda, but the Juliana plaintiffs
seek to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations at three hundred
and fifty ppm by 2100 (more ambitious and scientifically defensible
than the four hundred and fifty ppm associated with the 2oC under the
Paris Agreement).86
Notwithstanding whether the 2oC goal is sufficient, the
reasoning in Urgenda and similar cases could still help inform the
analysis in Juliana. To some extent, the fact that the world, including
the United States, has reached a scientifically based political
consensus on the temperature goal of climate mitigation relieves the
U.S. court from having to reach its own decision of how much
mitigation is enough. Like the courts in South Africa and Australia,87
the court can accept that consensus as a minimum benchmark against
which to measure U.S. actions, thus narrowing the political nature of
the decisions facing the court.
Moreover, the Trump
Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does not
change the fact that a scientifically supported political consensus has
“generally agreed” to the goal of avoiding DAI (and by implication
disruption of basic rights) requires limiting temperature increases to
well below” 2oC.
The Trump Administration strongly opposed the District Court
decision and took unprecedented steps to avoid the trial. After
initially failing to have the case certified for an interlocutory appeal,
the Administration filed an unprecedented number of petitions for
mandamus, including to the U.S. Supreme Court.88 Because these
84. Id.; Juliana v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1098 (D. Or. 2018) [hereinafter
“Juliana II”]. In its holding, the Court also rejected the government’s efforts to block the
case on political question grounds and on standing.
85. Juliana Complaint, supra note 78, ¶ 4.
86. Id.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
88. See, e,g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Lets Youth’s Case Demanding Climate
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efforts continued to delay the trial, the District Court certified the
case for an interlocutory appeal,89 and the Ninth Circuit agreed on
December 26, 2018, to hear the appeal.90
V. CLAIMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A different approach, one rooted in international environmental
law, has been taken in a recent petition before the European Court of
Justice. In Armando Ferrão Carvalho, et al. v. The European
Parliament and the Council, the plaintiffs alleged that the European
Parliament and Council have failed to take adequate steps to limit
GHG emissions.91 In addition to rights-based claims patterned after
Urgenda, the plaintiffs argued that the European Union was failing to
avoid transboundary environmental harm caused by climate change.92
The plaintiffs argue that the EU has violated its obligations under the
Paris Agreement and under customary international environmental
law to “do no harm” to States or areas outside of their jurisdiction. 93
According to the plaintiffs (some of whom are not EU
residents), the EU Member States have the obligation to prevent
significant harm to the population and environment of other states or
areas beyond national jurisdiction.”94 They rely on the “do no harm”
principle, which was first applied in the environmental context in the
1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration.95 In that case, the United States
sought to enjoin a lead smelter located in Trail, British Columbia,
from further polluting the air within the United States.96 The
arbitration panel ruled that international law recognizes each
country’s sovereign right to use its territory as it chooses, but not in a
manner that harms another State’s environment.97 The United
Action Proceed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/us/
politics/supreme-court-youth-climate-case.html; Karen Savage, Ninth Circuit Pauses Kids
Climate Suit to Hear Latest Government Appeal, CLIMATE LIABILITY NEWS (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/11/08/ninth-circuit-kids-climate-suit-appeal/.
89. Order, Juliana v. United States, Case No.: 6:15-cv-01517-AA (D. Or., Nov. 21,
2018) (certifying interlocutory appeal).
90. Order, Juliana v. United States, Case No.: 18-80176 (9th Cir., Dec. 26, 2018)
(granting interlocutory appeal).
91. Application for Annulment ¶¶ 137–140, Armando Ferrão Carvalho & Others v.
Parliament & Council, Case T-330-18 (filed May 24, 2018).
92. Id. ¶¶ 206-207.
93. Id. ¶¶ 287-289.
94. Id. ¶ 137.
95. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 1905 (Arb. Trib.
1941).
96. Id. at 1945, 1965.
97. Id. at 1965 (“[N]o State has the right to use of permit the use of its territory in such

HUNTER

2019]

PARIS AGREEMENT & GLOBAL CLIMATE LITIGATION

241

Nations endorsed the principle in both the Stockholm and Rio
Declarations.98 The International Court of Justice in Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, subsequently found
that “[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment
of other States or of areas beyond national control is now a part of the
corpus of international law relating to the environment.”99
The plaintiffs in Carvalho recognize that the do no-harm
principle is not absolute but requires identifying the contours of the
State’s duty of care. Citing the International Court of Justice, the
plaintiffs framed this standard as follows: “A State is thus obliged to
use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take
place in its territory or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing
significant damage to the environment of another State.”100 The
Petitioners argue that the degree of care required is proportional to
the risk that is involved.101 Citing the catastrophic hazards posed by
climate change “. . . the duty of care is particularly demanding. It
requires as a minimum that states must take all measures of which
they are technically and economically capable.”102
In the climate change context, petitioners argue that the Paris
Agreement lends specificity to the general duty of care. The
petitioners argue that the 2°C target in the Paris Agreement
“formulates a clear upper limit that must be regarded as binding hard
law in an obligation of result, not only of conduct.” The Petitioners
contend:

a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein, when the case if of serious consequence and the injury is established by
clear and convincing evidence.”).
98. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 1972); U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
99. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226, ¶¶ 29–30, 241–242 (July 8) (emphasis added); see also Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C. J. Rep. 135, ¶¶ 68, 193 (Apr. 20),
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/135; The Indus Waters Kishenganga (India v. Pak.), 31 U.N.
Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards 1, ¶¶ 448–449 (Indus Waters Treaty Ct. of Arb. 2013),
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXXI/1-358.pdf (referring to the rule in Trail Smelter as a
“foundational principle of customary international environmental law”).
100. Application for Annulment, supra note 91, ¶ 224.
101. Id. ¶ 226.
102. Id. ¶ 154.
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The threshold of ‘well below 2°C’ should not be
misunderstood to be an entitlement for states to fully
exploit the space up to 2°C. It is a maximum limit that
shall not be reached. Rather, States shall pursue ‘efforts
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C’. . .
The Paris Agreement has not superseded the no-harm
rule. The no-harm rule remains as a freestanding
customary international obligation. It follows that it may
impose obligations further than those reflected in the
Paris Agreement.103
In this way, petitioners invoke the Paris Agreement temperature
targets as informing an upper limit carbon budget beyond which
country contributions would be in violation of the obligation not to
cause transboundary harm.
As customary international law, the obligation not to cause harm
applies equally to all states, including the United States, unless the
state has consistently objected to its application.104 The United States
has not consistently objected. Indeed, the genesis of the principle as
noted above is the Trail Smelter Arbitration, in which the United
States succeeded in holding Canada responsible for transboundary air
pollution.105 In the United States, the principle is also viewed as
entailing an obligation to take due care to avoid significant harm.
According to the U.S. Restatement (Third) of the Law of Foreign
Relations:
1. A state is obligated to take such measures as may be
necessary, to the extent practicable under the
circumstances, to ensure that activities within its
jurisdiction or control
(a)conform to generally accepted international rules
and standards for the prevention, reduction, and
control of injury to the environment of another state or
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and

103. Id. ¶¶ 140–141.
104. See Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the
Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV . INT’L L. J. 457, 457 (1985).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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(b)are conducted so as not to cause significant injury
to the environment of another state or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction.106
At least in the climate context, the Paris Agreement arguably
qualifies as a “generally accepted international standard” that can
inform the interpretation and application of the customary law.107 The
obligation of due care thus arguably requires each country to take
measures consistent with its equitable share of mitigation aimed at
meeting the 2°C target.
The Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement likely does not change this analysis significantly. The
United States is still subject to its customary law obligations, and the
Paris Agreement’s temperature target remains a “generally accepted
international standard” that provides a useful reference point for
defining the obligation. In fact, the withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement and the retrenchment on climate change policies likely
strengthens the case that the United States has not met the ‘due care’
necessary to prevent the transboundary harm of climate change.
VI. SIGNALING THE FUTURE REGULATION OF CARBON
In addition to establishing an implicit carbon budget shaped by
the temperature goals, the Paris Agreement also sent clear signals
regarding the future regulation of carbon emissions. Furthermore, the
Agreement explicitly endorsed two other longer term goals: (1) to
reach a global peak of GHG emissions “as soon as possible” and (2)
to achieve a goal of zero net emissions after 2050.108 Although nonbinding, the Parties established a plan for operationalizing these longterm goals by inviting each Party to submit by 2020 “mid-century,
long-term low GHG development strategies.”109 Through this explicit
endorsement of a low-carbon future, the Parties signaled their resolve
to move the world’s economy away from fossil fuels.
Achieving the post-2050 no net GHGs goal does not, strictly
speaking, require the elimination of fossil fuels, because enhancing
carbon sinks or improving carbon capture technology could
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 601
(AM . LAW INST . 1987) (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
109. Report of the Paris CoP, supra note 27, ¶ 35; see also Paris Agreement, supra note
1, art. 4(19).
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theoretically still allow for significant use of fossil fuels.110
Nonetheless, the 2050 goal unequivocally builds momentum for a
low-carbon energy future and a significant preference for renewable
energy over fossil fuel sources. Although we may not be able to
predict our future energy mix, the Agreement suggests that fossil
fuels will be significantly less important. The Paris Agreement does
not include any binding requirements for achieving the long-term
vision, but it does provide a global policy framework that will guide
everything from international advocacy campaigns against fossil
fuels to national and subnational regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions, to voluntary initiatives to reduce energy use. Through
these pathways, the Paris Agreement foretells a significant change in
future energy usage. The Paris Agreement’s clear signal of change in
future energy markets potentially has a legal effect on at least two
types of future cases: those relating to the financial reporting of
fossil fuel companies and challenges brought under investor-state
dispute resolution systems by fossil fuel interests.111
A. Financial Reporting and Stranded Assets
The Paris Agreement reflected a global consensus in favor of a
low carbon future, one in which carbon will be heavily regulated and
highly priced.112 This presents a challenge to fossil fuel companies on
how to value their assets, particularly oil, gas, and coal reserves that
they expect to exploit in the future.113 If countries hold true to the
Paris Agreement’s commitments, the future development of many of
these reserves may be prohibited or prohibitively expensive—thus
potentially creating stranded assets with little actual value.114
Similarly, as carbon emissions are increasingly regulated, the costs of
fossil fuel use will increase (either directly through a carbon tax or
indirectly through requirements for emission reductions or carbon
110. See, e.g., David Biello, Can Carbon Capture Technology Be Part of the Climate
Solution?, YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (Sept. 8, 2014), https://e360.yale.edu/features/can_car
bon_capture_technology_be_part_of_the_climate_solution.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 112-131.
112. Mark Schapiro, Oil Companies Quietly Prepare for a Future of Carbon Pricing,
YALE ENVIRONMENT 360 (Sept. 23, 2014), https://e360.yale.edu/features/oil_companies_
quietly_prepare_for_a_future_of_carbon_pricing.
113. Id.
114. Sini Matikainen, What are stranded assets?, GRANTHAM RES. INST. ON CLIMATE
CHANGE & THE ENV’T (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/faqs/whatare-stranded-assets (noting that some of the causes of stranded assets include “new
government regulations that limit the use of fossil fuels (like carbon pricing); a change in
demand (for example, a shift towards renewable energy because of lower energy costs), or
even legal action.”).
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capture).115 Both the potential for declining value of stranded assets
and the potential for increasing costs of carbon emissions present
significant regulatory risks that, in turn, present challenges of
financial disclosure for the fossil fuel industry.
Failure to address these regulatory risks appropriately in
financial disclosure statements could lead to significant legal
liabilities. In October 2018, the Attorney General of New York
brought suit against ExxonMobil for allegedly “defrauding their
shareholders by downplaying the expected risks of climate change to
its business.”116 The Complaint alleges that Exxon misled investors
in concluding that governments would not strictly regulate GHG
emissions in accordance with a 2oC temperature scenario because the
projected costs were simply too high.117 According to the complaint,
“Exxon’s analysis of the costs associated with a two degree scenario
was based on assumptions it knew to be unreasonable and
unsupported by the sources upon which it purported to rely.”118
Exxon also allegedly told investors it was managing the costs to its
operations from future climate regulation, by consistently employing
an escalating “proxy cost” of GHG emissions in its evaluations and
projections of future operations.119 In reality, according to the
Attorney General of New York, ExxonMobil did not consistently
apply the proxy cost in evaluating their operations.120 As a result, the
company was exposed “to greater risk from climate change
regulation than what the investors were led to believe.”121 The
Attorney General of Massachusetts has opened a similar investigation
into Exxon, focusing on the company’s misrepresentations, both to
consumers and to investors, “with respect to the impact of fossil fuels
on climate change, and climate change-driven risks to Exxon’s
business.”122
115. See, e.g., James McAuley, France’s climate change commitments trigger rising
diesel prices and street protests, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/world/frances-climate-change-commitments-trigger-rising-diesel-prices-andstreet-protests/2018/11/17/fdc01fa6-e9b1-11e8-8449-1ff263609a31_story.html.
116. John Schwartz, New York Sues Exxon Mobil, Saying It Deceived Shareholders on
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/clim
ate/exxon-lawsuit-climate-change.html.
117. Complaint at ¶¶ 286–297, New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed
Oct. 24, 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/summons_and_complaint_0.pdf.
118. Id. ¶ 7.
119. Id. ¶¶ 286–297.
120. Id. ¶ 2-7.
121. Id. ¶ 2.
122. Attorney General’s Office Exxon Investigation, MASS .GOV , https://www.mass.gov/
lists/attorney-generals-office-exxon-investigation (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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Although the global discussion of a low-carbon future has been
progressing for over three decades, it is arguably not clear when that
discussion had coalesced to the point where global regulation of
carbon presented a material risk that had to be disclosed. Regardless
of what the standard may be for past disclosure decisions, since the
2015 Paris Agreement, carbon-intensive industries are on notice that
they face significant regulatory risks going forward. Litigation will
be available to ensure proper financial disclosure of those risks.
B. Future Investor – State Disputes
The Paris Agreement’s long-term goals also have implications
for investor-state disputes going forward. Under most multilateral
and bilateral investment treaties, investors are given an opportunity to
challenge national regulations they believe have severely affected
their operations.123 These provisions are meant to protect foreign
investors, who are often relying on thirty to forty years of revenue
flows to recoup their initial capital investment, from unexpected
efforts by host countries to expropriate their property. Such
protections are offered against both direct expropriations and indirect
regulatory takings based on unexpected regulation of the investor’s
property.124 Under most investment agreements, foreign investors can
bring their claim to an international arbitration panel or a similar
investor-state dispute system (ISDS).125
The Paris Agreement’s long-term commitments put the fossil
fuel industry and other emission-heavy industries on notice that
carbon will be more heavily regulated in the future. Thus notified,
investors will be hard-pressed to argue that future regulations were
unexpected or were intended to expropriate their property.
A similar argument prevailed in a recent challenge brought by
Philip Morris to Uruguay’s cigarette packaging regulation.126 In
ruling for Uruguay, the arbitration panel relied partly on the clear
signals of future regulation implicit in Uruguay’s participation in the

123. See James McBride, How Are Trade Disputes Resolved?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-are-trade-disputesresolved.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Phillip Morris Brands Sárl, et al., v. Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/10/7, Award (July 8, 2016) 26-29 (emphasis added).
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World Health Organization’s Convention on Tobacco Control.127
After detailing the guidelines for packaging regulations under the
Convention,128 the Tribunal held:
Manufacturers and distributors of harmful products
such as cigarettes can have no expectation that new
and more onerous regulations will not be imposed…
On the contrary, in light of widely accepted
articulations of international concern for the harmful
effect of tobacco, the expectation could only have
been of progressively more stringent regulation of the
sale and use of tobacco products.129
Although significant differences exist between the Tobacco
Convention and the Paris Agreement, the Paris Agreement is
arguably an “articulation of international concern” for the harmful
effects of fossil fuels.130 Like cigarette manufacturers, the fossil fuel
industry’s expectations can now only be of “progressively more
stringent regulation” of carbon.131 The signals from the Paris
Agreement should be a strong impediment to investor claims that
future regulations disadvantaging fossil fuel companies were
unexpected or arbitrary.
The Trump Administration’s withdrawal could blur the
regulatory signal emanating from the Paris Agreement, but only to
the extent it undermines the global consensus for stronger future
regulation of fossil fuels. Given that other countries have not
reversed their support for the Paris Agreement, companies operating
outside the United States should still expect host countries to enact
increasingly ambitious NDCs under the Agreement over time.132
When they do, investor challenges to regulations consistent with
those NDCs will likely be dismissed.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the more than three years since its adoption, the Paris
Agreement has begun to influence climate litigation in ways probably
not fully contemplated by the negotiators. The highly-scrutinized
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. ¶¶ 85–95.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 429–430.
Id.
Id.
See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
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compromise on the legal status of the NDCs resulted in a formally
binding Agreement, but with language specifically designed to ensure
the mitigation commitments were non-binding. Nonetheless, many
NDCs may be binding under national law and their adequacy may be
subject to judicial review.133 In addition, the Paris Agreement
provides a science-based, generally accepted global framework
against which national courts can evaluate climate mitigation
efforts,134 financial disclosures of climate risk,135 and investmentbacked expectations of future regulations.136
The Paris Agreement’s temperature targets and mid- and longterm mitigation goals, along with its principles and procedures for
developing future NDCs, are providing an implicit carbon budget and
framework for informing foreign courts’ deliberations regarding
climate-related cases. The framework is not providing a legal
requirement, but it is providing the factual background from which
courts calculate, for example, a country’s equitable share of climate
mitigation efforts necessary to avoid catastrophic climate change
impacts.
The Paris Agreement’s role in shaping future litigation will not
be significantly limited by the Trump Administration’s decision to
withdraw, particularly as his lead is not being followed by other
countries. Most obviously, courts in other jurisdictions will not view
one country’s politically motivated disavowal of the Agreement as
undermining the general consensus that supports the mitigation
approach taken at Paris. Even in the United States, the withdrawal
may not end the utility of the Agreement to litigators. Just as in other
jurisdictions, reliance on the Agreement may be based on its general
affirmation of a scientifically based set of mitigation goals. The legal
basis for a claim in the United States may have to come from some
other legal doctrine (just as it has in foreign jurisdictions), but the fact
that a general consensus exists affirming the temperature and
mitigation goals is not dependent on the United States maintaining its
participation in the Agreement. These aspects of the Agreement will
continue to provide a valid framework within which a court can
evaluate climate mitigation efforts, financial disclosures, and investor
expectations, among other climate-related challenges.

133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
See supra text accompanying notes 48-107.
See supra text accompanying notes 112-121.
See supra text accompanying notes 122-31.

